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Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept of
effort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for an
explicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at this
definition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1
presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and argues
that few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues that
such a definition is now needed and proposes a basic methodology to arrive at it, whose
first step is to make explicit the various tacit assumptions about effort made across
sciences and ordinary thinking. Section 3 unearths 4 different conceptions of effort
from research on effort so far: primitive-feelings accounts, comparator-based accounts,
resource-based accounts and force-based accounts. It is then argued that the first 2
kinds of accounts, although interesting in their own right, are not strictly speaking about
effort. Section 4 considers the 2 most promising general approaches to efforts: re-
source-based and force-based accounts. It argues that these accounts are not only
compatible but actually extensionally equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains why
force-based accounts should be regarded are more fundamental than resource-based
accounts.
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Efforts are ubiquitous and multifarious. We
make efforts—individual and collective—to lift
heavy weights, to solve problems, to concen-
trate, to stop smoking, to climb mountains, to
convince others, to understand obscure texts, to
improve our linguistic skills, to conceal our
vices, to resist temptations, to seduce, to gather
information, to earn money, to stay calm, to win
games, to raise children, to write clearly, and so
forth Not only do we make efforts, we also
value efforts in various ways: We deem them
unpleasant, praiseworthy, efficient, vain, irratio-
nal, tenacious, and so forth. We often judge that
people deserve some retribution or compensa-
tion for their efforts (and conversely some
blame for their lack of effort), and we try to
inculcate in children the “taste for effort”.
Unsurprisingly, given the ubiquity and mul-
tifariousness of efforts, a wide variety of sci-
ences have been interested in efforts: various
areas of psychology, economics, sociology,
neurosciences, legal studies, sport sciences, ro-
botics and artificial intelligence, ethology, and
philosophy have scrutinized efforts. A broad
range of causes and determinants of efforts have
been investigated, and (as we shall see) efforts
have been used to explained an impressive va-
riety of phenomena.
Quite surprisingly, however, given this pro-
fusion of research on effort, few explicit defini-
tions of effort are to be found in the vast and
multidisciplinary literature that makes extensive
use of the concept. Although definitions of
some species of effort have been proposed, the
genus—what all efforts have in common and in
virtue of which they are efforts—remains
largely undefined. Tellingly, no entry on effort
is to be found in leading professional encyclo-
pedias of neurosciences, psychology, sociology,
economics, or philosophy, and, as of today,
even Wikipedia lacks an entry on effort. Work
on effort has largely relied on implicit and
pretheoretical understanding of effort. Al-
though such an intuitive grasp has proven suf-
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ficient to investigate various aspects of effort,
the lack of an accepted explicit definition may
impede the integration of the manifold re-
searches on efforts and foster misunderstanding.
Accordingly, this article argues that the time
is ripe to look for an explicit general definition
of effort, makes some proposals about how to
arrive at this definition, and suggests that a
force-based approach is the most promising.
Section 1 presents an interdisciplinary overview
of some chief research axes on effort, and ar-
gues that few, if any, explicit definitions of
effort in general have been proposed so far.
Section 2 argues that such a definition is now
needed and proposes a basic methodology to
arrive at it. The key idea is to make explicit the
various tacit assumptions about effort made
across sciences as well as in ordinary thinking,
so as to retain the most promising assumptions
in an explicit definition. Section 3 unearths four
different conceptions of effort from research on
effort so far:
(i) Primitive-feelings accounts;
(ii) Comparator-based accounts;
(iii) Resource-based accounts;
(iv) Force-based accounts.
It is argued that the first two kinds of ac-
counts, although interesting in their own right,
are not strictly speaking about effort. Section 4
considers the two most promising general ap-
proaches to efforts: resource-based and force-
based accounts. It argues that these accounts are
not only compatible but actually extensionally
equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains
why force-based accounts should be regarded as
more fundamental than resource-based ac-
counts.
Research on Effort:
An Interdisciplinary Overview
The concept of effort has regularly been in-
voked in many areas of philosophy (philosophy
of action, moral philosophy, philosophy of cau-
sation, political philosophy, philosophy of
mind, philosophy of law) as well as in many
research areas outside of philosophy (psychol-
ogy of emotion, of motivation, of learning and
education, of tactual perception, of attention;
evolutionary psychology; classical, neoclassi-
cal, welfare, labor, institutional, behavioral eco-
nomics; exercise physiology; sport sciences;
biomechanics; sociology; law and legal studies;
ethology; robotics; etc.).
Research pertaining to efforts can be classi-
fied using six broad areas:
(1) research on the consciousness or feeling
of effort;
(2) research on the causes or determinants of
efforts: what explains effort?
(3) research on the effects or functions of
efforts: what does effort explain?
(4) research on some subspecies of effort;
(5) research on the value(s) and normative
implications of efforts;
(6) research on cognate concepts, such as
trying, work, forces fatigue.
The following is an overview of some main
works in these six areas. It should be stressed
from the start that this overview is not exhaus-
tive. Given that effort is a transversal concept,
cutting across a wide variety of disciplines, and
that no attempt has been made so far at review-
ing the main research connected to efforts in all
these disciplines, the following list is bound to
be incomplete. Besides, given my own back-
ground, philosophical works on the topic may
well be overrepresented here. But I hope that
the following adequately reflects at least some
of the chief research axes on effort, if not the
details of all research about effort.
Works on the Sense, Awareness, or Feeling
of Effort
The awareness of effort has drawn a lot of
attention, which perhaps culminated in the late
19th century controversy about the feeling of
effort between centralists—for example, Bain
(1855); Helmholtz (1866); Müller (1842)—who
equated the feeling of effort to the feeling of
some efferent commands of our will, and pe-
ripheralists—for example, Bastian (1896);
James (1880, 1890)—who equated the feeling
of effort to the afferent feelings of muscle con-
tractions (see Jeannerod, 1983: 121–140, 1996:
104–114, 2002: Chap. V; and Forest, 2007 for
detailed discussions of this debate). The dispute
is to some extent still ongoing (see de Morree,
Klein, & Marcora, 2012; Marcora, 2009 for
recent defenses of the centralist view, and Laf-
argue & Franck, 2009; Lafargue & Sirigu, 2006
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for some intermediate approaches in terms of
the comparator model).
These discussions constitute one high point
in the history of research on effort. For all their
virtues, they may however suffer from an im-
portant downside: The relation between effort
and the awareness of effort is mostly left unad-
dressed within the context of the centralists/
peripheralists debate. While the discussions
starts by considering the experience, sensation,
or feeling of effort rather than effort in general,
most of the participants then move freely be-
tween talking about effort and talking about the
feeling of effort. The tacit assumption seems to
be that effort just is a feeling. The identification
of effort with the feeling thereof, however,
might prove more problematic than expected, as
we shall see below.
Works on the Determinants of Efforts
Another substantial body of research bears on
the various bases of efforts—or of some sub-
species thereof: What determines that we make,
pursue, or withhold efforts? Three main kinds
of determinants of efforts have been studied:
(i) Physiological and neurobiological de-
terminants of efforts (see, e.g., Gailliot
& Baumeister, 2007; Gailliot et al.,
2007; Gendolla, Wright, & Richter,
2012; Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, &
Dolan, 2011; Radulescu, Nagai, &
Critchley, 2014; Salamone, Correa, Far-
rar, & Mingote, 2007; Treadway et al.,
2012).
(ii) Psychological determinants of efforts.
How are the worthiness of the task (the
rewards), the chance of success, the dif-
ficulty of the task, our own skill, and so
forth, weighted against each other so as
to determine whether an effort should be
undertaken (Brehm & Self, 1989;
Marien, Aarts, & Custers, 2014; West-
brook & Braver, 2015; Wright, 2016)?
At what point do we persist in striving
for a goal when the goal of disengage-
ment becomes a live possibility (Brand-
stätter et al., 2013; Brandstätter &
Schüler, 2013)? How do symptoms of
depression affect effort-making (Brink-
mann, Franzen, Rossier, & Gendolla,
2014; Silvia, Nusbaum, Eddington,
Beaty, & Kwapil, 2014)? (See Gollwit-
zer & Oettingen, 2012, for a review of
the literature on psychological determi-
nants of effort.)
(iii) Socioeconomical determinants of efforts
have been studied in detail in particular
within behavioral economics. Propo-
nents of the “fair-wage effort hypothe-
sis” have argued that workers modulate
their effort according to the difference
between their actual wage and the wage
they consider as fair (Akerlof & Yellen,
1990). Workers appear to also modulate
their efforts with respect to the evolution
of other workers’ wages, so that social
comparisons also determine effort
(Cohn, Fehr, Herrmann, & Schneider,
2014). Yet another factor influencing the
amount of effort invested in work is
whether the wage has been fixed by a
third party (“responsibility-alleviation,”
Charness, 2000). Some of these results
had been anticipated by Baldamus
(1961).
Works on the Functions of Efforts
Most research on effort uses effort as a key
explanans of other phenomena rather than treat
effort as an explanandum. On top of the protean
“principle of least effort” (which was intro-
duced by Ferrero, 1894, developed by Zipf,
1949, and is the idea that agents try to minimize
the amount of work expended), which is recur-
rently appealed to as a key assumption in vari-
ous areas such as ethology, ecology, linguistics,
economics, and psychology (see, e.g., Hull,
1943), efforts have been used to explain a wide
variety of objects. This has often been the case
within philosophy:
(i) In philosophy of action, the concept of
effort has been invoked to capture the
central distinction between actions and
mere happenings. Volitionists have of-
ten proposed analyzing actions in
terms of happenings caused by voli-
tions or acts of will (although not all
volitionists do so; some consider voli-
tions to be themselves unanalyzable
actions). In response to Ryle’s objec-
tion that volitions are mysterious and
noticeably absent from ordinary lan-
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guage (Ryle, 1949: 64), many volition-
ists have identified volitions with try-
ings, strivings, or efforts (Davis, 1979;
Ginet, 1990; Hornsby, 1980; Lowe,
1996: 157 sqq., 2000: 246 sqq.; Mc-
Cann, 1975; O’Shaughnessy, 1980).
One early proposal of this sort is to be
found in Lewes (1878) who presents
effort as what distinguishes the fact
that I raise my arm from the fact that
my arm goes up.
(ii) In the context of the free will debate,
Kane’s influential incompatibilist–
libertarian theory of free will gives a
key role to effort of will. A choice is
free, Kane argues, only if it results
from an effort of will that is itself in-
determinate (Kane, 1996: 128). Kane’s
proposal has prompted intense discus-
sions, some of which specifically target
the concept of effort of will he employs
(Clarke, 1999; Coffman, 2004; Mele,
2006).
(iii) The concept of effort has also played a
key role in the classical issue of akra-
sia or weakness of will. Challenging
the received Davidsonian view that the
akratic agent acts against his best judg-
ment, Holton (1999, 2009: Chap. 6)
argues that the weak-willed subject
rather acts against his former resolu-
tions. Sticking to one’s resolutions,
Holton argues, requires willpower, or
strength of will, the exercise of which
takes effort. Likewise, Ainslie (2001)
equates willpower with the ability to
stick to one’s personal rules (an ability,
he stresses, that comes with its own
downsides), so that willpower helps us
resist our tendency to prefer present
satisfactions over delayed ones.
(iv) The justification and origin of our idea
of an external world is another central
philosophical issue in which a key role
has been assigned to effort. A long-
standing proposal in both philosophy
and genetic psychology has it that the
feeling of effort is essential to the jus-
tification and/or to the origin of our
belief in an external world. According
to this proposal, only that which is re-
sistant to our efforts is to be repre-
sented as existing independently from
us. In direct versions of the view, the
feeling of resistance to our efforts is
held to directly present us with the
distinction between us and the external
world; in indirect versions of the view,
the feeling of resistance is only
claimed to constitute a key premise in
an inference to the existence of the
external world. It is partly because of
this epistemological issue that the feel-
ing of effort gained a lot of attention
during the 19th century, which
prompted the debate between central-
ists and peripheralists mentioned
above. This led James to write, albeit
disapprovingly, “There is no com-
moner remark than this, that resistance
to our muscular effort is the only sense
which makes us aware of a reality in-
dependent from ourselves” (James,
1880). Various versions of the thesis
that resistance to our will or effort is a
symptom of reality are to be found in
Descartes (1993: 101; 2000, Seconde
Partie, §1 —although Descartes does
not mention the term “resistance” or
“effort”), Malebranche (1991: 40 -43),
Locke (2008, IV, xi, §5), Berkeley
(1998: 105), Condillac (1997), Fichte
(1963), Maine de Biran (2000, 2002,
who also attributes the view to Schell-
ing, Bouterwek, and Bichat), Schopen-
hauer (1969, Bk II), Brown (1846, lec.
XXIV: 151), Müller (1842: 269), Des-
tutt de Tracy (1801: pp. 113 -122, 331
-334), Bain (1855, 1872: 198, 1875),
Fouillée (1889), Durkheim (1999: 22),
Peirce (1935: 1.24, 1.320, 1.324,
1.332, 2.84, 5.7, 5.45, 5.539, 5.607,
6.19, 7.531, 8.266, 8.330), Dilthey
(2010), Scheler (1961, Chaps. II & III,
1973b, 1973a: 135 -8), Heymans
(1905), Baldwin (1906), Katz (1935: 8,
1989: 51), Stout, 1931 (Bk. IV, Chaps.
1 & 6); and, more recently, Garnett,
(1965), Hampshire (1982), Hamlyn
(1990), Baldwin (1995), Russell (1995,
1996), Cassam (1999), Bermudez
(2000: 164), Smith (2002), Williams
(2002: 136), Matthen (2005: 8), Mas-
sin (2009, 2011c), Declerck (2014).
(v) Absorption. The contrapositive thesis
has also been considered in some de-
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tail. In the same way that the feeling of
effort (“effort-fulness”) has been
claimed to be the chief source of our
knowledge of the distinction between
ourselves and the world, effortlessness
has been claimed as the explanation for
cases where the subject–object distinc-
tion vanishes. That effortlessness leads
to the disappearance of the self–world
dualism is an important strand in phil-
osophical and psychological research
pertaining to the ownership of one’s
body and the use of tools. One recur-
ring hypothesis here is that we experi-
ence as belonging to our own body not
just any parts of our own biological
body but also any external appendage
that we can move at will, without ef-
fort. The locus classicus on tools and
prosthetic touch is Lotze (1888, Bk V,
Chap. 2, §4: 588–9), and further exam-
inations of tool integration are to be
found in de Vignemont (2007, 2013,
2014), Gibson (1968); Katz (1989);
Klatzky and Lederman (1999); Martin
(1992, 1995); O’Shaughnessy (2003);
Stout (1903: 92–3); Wagmann and
Carello (2003); and Yamamoto and Ki-
tazawa (2001). As pointed out by Bil-
leter (2002), a similar idea is to be
found within Chinese philosophy. The
transition from self–world dualism to
the absorption of the subject in the
object is a central theme in the philos-
ophy of Tchouang-Tseu. Tchouang-
Tseu put forward several detailed de-
scriptions of initially complex actions
in which the subject–object distinction
vanishes as the action becomes per-
formed with more and more ease.
(vi) The experience of effort has also been
claimed to constitute our primary epis-
temological access to causal relations.
Arguing that causation is nowhere to
be presented in experience, Hume dis-
cusses this possibility in a famous foot-
note. It is not the case, Hume argues,
that the experience of effort, or nisus,
presents us with relations of necessita-
tion between distinct existents. The
view that feelings of effort give us em-
pirical access to necessary connections
or forces has however been endorsed,
pace Hume, by Newton (see Jammer,
1999), Maine de Biran (1993, 2002),
Broad (1923: 162), Spiegelberg (1960,
vol. 2: 662), Fales (1990: 12), Beebee
(2009), Schrenk (2014), Marshall
(2015).
(vii) Efforts have also been appealed to in
answer to the philosophical question of
the nature of achievements. Bradford
(2014: Chap. 2) has recently proposed a
detailed account of achievements, which
she partly analyses in terms of products
of difficult processes, where the difficulty
of a process is in turn understood in
terms of effort. Bradford therefore takes
efforts to be primitive, and analyses dif-
ficulty in terms of efforts.
(viii) On top of giving us access to causation
and to the distinction between ourselves
and the world, the feeling of effort has
been ascribed various other epistemic
functions. It has been claimed (a) to give
us access to our own agency (the relation
between the feeling of efforts and the
sense of agency is discussed in Bayne,
2011; Demanet, Muhle-Karbe, Lynn,
Blotenberg, & Brass, 2013; Dries, 2013;
Pacherie, 2007, 2008; Preston &
Wegner, 2009); (b) to inform us about
the likeliness of success (Kruger, Wirtz,
Van Boven, & Altermatt, 2004); (c) to
present us with the solidity of bodies
(Locke, 2008, II, iv); (d) to inform us
about our energy expenditures (Pres-
ton & Wegner, 2009); (e) to inform
us about the need to stop an ongoing
task or to reassess it against alterna-
tives (Hockey, 2011; Inzlicht,
Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014; Kurz-
ban, 2016; van der Linden, 2011).
(ix) Muscular efforts have been used to ex-
plain the achievements of haptic or ef-
fortful tactile perception (e.g., Lederman,
Ganeshan, & Ellis, 1996; McCloskey,
Ebeling, & Goodwin, 1974; Turvey,
1996; Turvey & Carello, 2011).
(x) Mental efforts (in this context inter-
changeably called “effort of cognition,”
“decision costs,” or “mental labor”) have
been appealed to as a key variable in
experimental economics to explain why
decision makers do not always take the
decisions that would maximize their
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monetary payoff (V. L. Smith & Walker,
1993; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999 refine
this labor-theory of cognition by intro-
ducing the ideas of cognitive capital and
production).
(xi) Effort has been appealed to in order to
explain why bizarre or difficult linguistic
stimuli are better remembered than com-
mon stimuli (the “processing-difficulty
effect”: E. J. O’Brien & Myers, 1985;
Walker, Jones, & Mar, 1983; the “bi-
zarreness effect”: Imai & Richman,
1991).
Works on Species of Efforts
Fourth, although the nature of the genus ef-
fort remains a largely unexplored area, impor-
tant research has been pursued pertaining to the
nature of various subspecies of effort:
(i) On the nature of muscular effort (Ban-
nister, 1956; McArdle, Katch, & Katch,
2009; Nubar & Contini, 1961);
(ii) On the nature of effort of attention (Kah-
neman, 1973) or cognitive effort (Ack-
erman, 2011; Kruglanski et al., 2012;
Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers,
2013; Westbrook & Braver, 2015), or on
some aspect of such efforts, such as their
subjective difficulty (Robinson & Mor-
sella, 2014).
(iii) On moral effort, effort of will, or effort
to resist temptation (C. Campbell, 1939;
Holton, 2009; Fehr, 2002; Knoch &
Fehr, 2007).
We shall below return to the content of the
main proposals advanced in these various fields.
Works on the Value(s) of Effort
Another important research area concerns the
value(s) of effort. It has recurrently been
claimed in practical philosophy that effort con-
stitutes one main basis of desert (Bradford,
2014; Sadurski, 1985a,1985b; Sher, 1979). Fur-
thermore, the idea that effort has a moral value
is reflected in influential conceptions of justice,
economic values, and ownership:
(i) Desert-based conceptions of distributive
justice have it that wealth should reward
efforts (Milne, 1986; Miller, 1989, 1996;
Roemer, 2009; Sadurski, 1985a,1985b;
see Lamont, 1995 for critics).
(ii) Labor theories of economic value (Locke,
1988; see Marx & Engels, 1867; Ricardo,
1891; A. Smith, 1887; Vaughn, 1978; see
Carson, 2004 for a recent reassessment)
have it that the economic value of a good
results from the amount of effort needed
to produce it, or, alternatively, from the
effort spared to the owner of that good.
The difficulty of labor is thus an omni-
present idea in Smith, who constantly ap-
peals to “hard work,” “hardship endured,”
“toil and trouble,” and the like to explain
economic value. Bastiat (1996) and his
American disciple Perry (1878) equate
economics with the science of exchanges
and argue that efforts, rather than goods,
are the fundamental “exchangeables,” the
basic entities we trade. Hearn (1864) even
proposed defining economics as the “sci-
ence of efforts to satisfy human want.”
The intuitive motivation behind the view
that efforts confer value to the things pro-
duced through them has been studied in
psychology by studies on “effort heuris-
tics” (Kruger et al., 2004) and in social
psychology by studies on “effort justifica-
tion” (Aronson & Mills, 1959); a closely
related idea is also suggested by studies
on the “Ikea effect” (see Norton, Mochon,
& Ariely, 2011), according to which peo-
ple attach more value to goods that they
played a role in creating.
(iii) Labor theories of appropriation. Locke
(1988) famously claimed that one be-
comes the owner of a good by “mixing”
one’s labor with it. That ownership is as a
retribution for one’s effort has been ad-
vanced in recent discussions about intel-
lectual property rights (Rosenberg, 2013).
It is however difficult to determine what is
valuable in effort in the absence of a prior
understanding of the nature of effort. One prom-
ising answer, which fits nicely with the hypoth-
esis that efforts are to be analyzed in terms of
forces, has however been advanced by Regin-
ster (2007) in the context of interpreting Nietz-
sche’s view on the value of the will to power,
the rough idea being that effort spent in the
process of overcoming resistance accrues some
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agonistic intrinsic value (I come back to this
proposal below).
Works on Cognate Concepts
A last group of research, although they do not
explicitly mention efforts, instead targets con-
cepts that are arguably tightly connected to ef-
fort. Such concepts are that of tryings, of forces,
of work, of fatigue, and of difficulty.
(i) Trying. Independently of its possible role in
the definition of action mentioned above,
the concept of trying has itself become a
target of investigation. The concepts of ef-
fort and trying are arguably close cognates;
one promising hypothesis to be considered
below is that efforts constitute a subspecies
of tryings. It is indeed plausible that all
efforts are tryings—although the reverse
may not hold. Waismann (1994) writes,
“’To try’ seems to mean less than ’to make
an effort’; there is no reference to any en-
ergy in ’trying’” (p. 72; see also Glock,
1996; Hacker, 2000, 571–572). Effortless
tryings to move objects might occur in the
world imagined by Descartes: “If every
time our hands moved towards any place,
all the bodies in that place receded as
quickly as our hands approached, we
should never feel hardness [!resistan-
ce]”(Principles, II, iv). Preventive tryings
such as trying to cause a draft by not clos-
ing the window might also be effortless
(see Von Wright, 1963). If true, the three
following issues about trying might gener-
alize to efforts:
• The first bears on the relation between
trying and action. On the standard
view, trying to " is an essential ingre-
dient of the action of "-ing. The view
comes in two main versions: Either
trying to " is held to be a common
ingredient in both the action of "-ing
and the failed attempt to " (Arm-
strong, 1973; Broadie, 1966: 29; Gorr,
1979: 237; Grice, 1991: Chap.1; Mc-
Cann, 1975; Peacocke, 2008: 249); or
trying to " is held to be identical to
the action of "-ing in case of success,
but to be a sui generis mental event in
case of failure (various versions of
that disjunctive approach have been
developed by Faulkner, 2014; Horn-
sby, 1980: 34 –39; 2010; L. O’Brien,
2007: Chap. 8; and O’Shaughnessy,
1973, 2009). There are several problems
with the view that acting necessitates try-
ing (see in particular Schroeder, 2001).
Following the pioneering works of Taylor
(1973) and Chisholm (1976: 69–84), it
has been argued, against the standard
view, that one should analyze tryings in
terms of actions rather than actions in
terms of tryings (Cleveland, 1997; Grün-
baum, 2008; Hacker, 2000: 571; Jones,
1983; Massin, 2014b; Wilson, 1989). This
“action-theory of trying” has recently
come under attack in a series of papers
by Ruben (2013, 2015, 2016), albeit not
on behalf of the standard view, but in
defense of a conditional theory of try-
ings whose main upshot is that tryings
are not particulars.
• Another relevant discussion pertains to
the limit of what one can try. James
(1890) noticed that “the sense of impo-
tence inhibits the volition.” Ludwig
(1995) argues along similar lines, as an
answer to Adams (1995), that one can-
not try to do what one thinks is impos-
sible; Schmid (2011) argues that the
ability-constraints on tryings and inten-
tions are given by some affective rather
than cognitive states. If similar con-
straints apply to efforts, such discus-
sions may prove highly relevant for de-
termining the limits of what one can
strive for.
• Third, the concept of trying has also
received important attention within
practical philosophy. In moral philoso-
phy, Griffith (2007) has recently argued
that trying is the locus of freedom and
responsibility; Scheler (1973a) suggests
in various places that strivings are the
primary bearers of moral values. One
also finds a vast literature within the
philosophy of law and legal studies
about the penal status of attempts (see
notably Duff, 1996). Yaffe (2010) has
recently argued that identifying attempts
with tryings, which legal studies fail to
do explicitly, paves the way for a solu-
tion to the problem of the criminaliza-
tion of attempts. According to the
236 MASSIN
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
“transfer principle” he endorses, at-
tempts inherit their penal status from the
conducts they would have led to, had
they been successful.
(ii) Forces. A second concept tightly con-
nected to effort is that of forces. How
exactly the two concepts relate to each
other is a question that I shall come
back to below, but one possibility, al-
luded to above, is that the feeling of
effort gives us epistemological access
to forces, construed as causal rela-
tions. Another, entirely compatible,
way is to construe the relation between
effort and forces as metaphysical: Per-
haps forces (physical, mental) are key
ingredients of efforts, in the sense that
efforts essentially involve the exertion
of some forces, as the etymology of
the term seems to indicate (the word
comes from the old French “esforz,”
meaning exerting strength). The phys-
ical and philosophical discussions sur-
rounding the concept of forces have a
long and fascinating history (Jammer,
1999). Antirealism about forces used
to be a fairly standard view, firmly
grounded in both the Cartesian and
Humean traditions (there were, how-
ever, important exceptions: Bolzano,
1972; Boscovich, 1966; Euler, 1752;
Kant, 2004). Recent works in philoso-
phy of sciences and metaphysics have
however reinstated force-realism as a
viable and plausible option (Arm-
strong, 1997; Bigelow, Ellis, & Par-
getter, 1988; Creary, 1981; Esfeld,
2013; Fales, 1990; Johansson, 2004;
Massin, 2009, 2016; Molnar, 2003;
Strawson, 1987; J. J. Wilson, 2002,
2007, 2009). This progress toward a
realist understanding of forces argu-
ably paves the way for an analysis of
efforts partly in terms of forces.
(iii) Work and labor. On top of the con-
cepts of trying and forces, the impor-
tant but scattered literature on con-
cepts of labor or work (see, e.g.,
Applebaum, 1992; Hamesse, 1990;
Theocarakis, 2010) displays important
connections between the concepts of
work and of effort. How are these con-
cepts connected? One possibility is
that work or labor correspond to a
subspecies of effort: the kind of effort
that characterizes activity that aims at
producing some economic goods or
services. Clearly not all effortful ac-
tivity is work: The effort we invest in
winning a game, in trying to convince
a friend, or in cleaning one’s car is not
work in the strict sense. The young kid
digging a hole in the sand and com-
plaining that it is a lot of work is
plausibly stretching the concept of
work.
(iv) Fatigue. The concept of fatigue is
tightly connected to the concept of ef-
fort and has been the target of various
psychological works (e.g., Ackerman,
2011; Hockey, 2013; Noakes, 2012).
(v) Difficulty. The concept of difficulty,
likewise, seems tightly connected to
the concept of effort. Authors who
subscribe to the motivation intensity
theory (Brehm & Self, 1989; Gen-
dolla, Wright, & Richter, 2012) hy-
pothesize an essential connection be-
tween effort and difficulty, according
to which effort is a function of (or
amounts to?) the difficulty of the be-
havior required to reach an end. West-
brook and Braver (2015) argued that
some difficult task might not be effort-
ful, if by difficulty we mean a low
probability of success (e.g., hitting the
bullseye is difficult, but not clearly
effortful). We will also come back to
this concept of difficulty below.
Limits of the Present Research
Despite significant scientific advances in the
determinants, roles, values, and subspecies of
efforts, as we have seen, works addressing the
question of what all efforts have in common, in
virtue of which they are efforts, remain absent
from the actual state of the art. With respect to
such a general definition of effort, the present
state of the art is lacking in four respects:
1. While there are substantial works about the
nature of some species of effort (muscular,
cognitive . . .), virtually no work on the
genus effort is to be found.
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2. Research works on effort remain scattered:
They target different functions, features, or
species of efforts, and remain widely iso-
lated from each other.
3. Research on the value of efforts has re-
mained largely disconnected from re-
search on their nature. The question of
what it is about the nature of efforts that
grounds their moral worth remains largely
unaddressed; likewise, the constraints put
on the nature of efforts by our evaluation
of efforts is hardly ever taken into
consideration.
Why We Need a Definition of Effort
This section argues that, given the present
state of effort-research, an explicit and general
definition of effort would constitute an impor-
tant step forward. One may, however, object
that it runs contrary to the spirit of empirical
research to adopt a definition of effort prior to
empirical investigation. We should not put the
cart before the horse: Empirical sciences will
eventually deliver a definition of effort—an un-
derstanding of its real nature—but they cannot
start from a definition. First, we uncover the
various causes and physiological substrates of
effort, then we find out what effort is. Or so the
objection goes.
There is some truth in this line of thought:
Not everything about effort can be known “from
the armchair.” I maintain, however, that some
truths about effort not only can but must be
known from the armchair—and these truths are
crucial for effort research. Here are a couple of
arguments to this effect.
First, there clearly are propositions about ef-
fort which we know to be true prior to any
empirical investigations. “Effort is not a planet”
is one of them, albeit admittedly hardly illumi-
nating. As we will see, more relevant a priori
claims about the nature effort can be uncovered.
Here is a blunt list of some of these claims, to be
defended below: “Efforts are not feelings”; “Ef-
forts are actions”; “Efforts can fail or succeed”;
“Efforts are always exerted against some resis-
tance”; “Effort are always made to reach some
goal”; “The intensity of efforts is not a function
of their failure/success.”
The second reason why we need to get clear
about a definition of effort prior to empirical
investigations is that, absent an initial definition
of effort, we face three impossibilities. First, the
practical impossibility of investigation: How
are we to look for something we have no idea
about?1 Second, the theoretical impossibility of
mistake: Whatever is found can be claimed to be
exactly what we were looking for. Third, the
epistemic impossibility of disagreement: If ef-
fort cannot be characterized independently of
the various empirical explanations of it that can
be given, then no two such explanations could
ever conflict, for no two explanations would
ever be about the same explanandum. So, em-
pirical investigations into efforts depend on
some prior understanding of what efforts are.
This may sound trivial, but note that one imme-
diate consequence of it is more controversial:
namely, that scientific inquiries are not empiri-
cal through and through and must rely on some
a priori characterization of their objects.
Third, a growing concern is that research on
effort is too scattered. Richter and Wright, in
their introduction to the sole volume to date that
aims at unifying research into effort from vari-
ous fields of psychology, write:
Given the history of effort discussions and the current
level of interest in effort processes, one might think
there would be a consensus on the character of the
effort construct. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
[. . .] Although disagreements about effort character are
understandable and healthy in some respects, they im-
pede the advancement of related science and must
ultimately be resolved. (Richter & Wright, 2014, p.
745)
Plausibly, the lack of a common definition of
effort impedes interdisciplinary collaboration.
In particular, since different areas of effort re-
search often target different species of effort,
bringing together these divergent works is dif-
ficult precisely because of the lack of a shared
account of the genus effort. Psychologists
studying attention, philosophers studying weak-
ness of will, physiologists studying muscle ex-
ercise and ethologists studying mating behavior
are interested in different species of efforts—
efforts of attention, efforts of will/to resist
1 A problem is known as the “paradox of inquiry” or
“Meno’s paradox,” after the following famous passage of
Plato: “How will you look for [a definition of virtue],
Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will
you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If
you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the
thing that you did not know?” (Plato, Meno, 80d, in Cooper,
1997: 880).
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temptations, muscular efforts, and mating ef-
forts. While some of the problems they encoun-
ter and some of the solutions they propose are
often strikingly similar (as we shall see), trans-
fer and collaboration between such fields is
hampered by the lack of a common account of
effort.
Fourth, exclusive reliance on a tacit under-
standing of effort leads to misunderstanding and
equivocation. Von Kriegstein recently raised
this worry about philosophical research pertain-
ing to effort:
While rarely analyzed itself, the concept of effort is
used to analyze other important concepts in a variety of
philosophical contexts, including desert, attention,
competence, and distributive justice. Given the ambi-
guities in our everyday notion of effort [. . .], using an
unanalyzed notion of effort to explicate these other
concepts runs the risk of equivocating between differ-
ent concepts. (Von Kriegstein, 2017, p. 28)
What holds true within philosophy holds true
mutatis mutandis across various scientific disci-
plines. Absent an agreed-on explicit definition,
the possibility that researchers from various
fields use the term “effort” to refer to utterly
distinct phenomena cannot be ruled out, so it
may be that no unique concept of effort is to be
found across sciences. As we have seen, an
impressive variety of explanatory roles are as-
cribed to the concept of effort. This may raise
legitimate suspicion about the unity of such an
all-purpose explanans. A possibility, therefore,
is that instead of a single generic concept of
effort, we can find only disparate uses of the
term “effort” referring to no common natural
kind. Just as some have claimed that the ordi-
nary concepts of pain (Corns, 2016; Hardcastle,
2001) or of mental state (Churchland, 1981) are
of no scientific relevance, one may argue that,
once we subject it to scrutiny, the idea that there
is a single concept underlying the various uses
of “efforts“ in the various sciences loses its
plausibility. The inevitable conclusion is that
science should get rid of it. Such a skeptical or
eliminativist conclusion is not to be excluded ex
ante and would in itself constitute a substantive
result. For the unity of the concept of effort is
widely taken for granted and hardly ever ques-
tioned. In ethics, many different species of ef-
forts are considered to be equally viable candi-
dates when it comes to grounding desert.
Furthermore, in economics and in behavioral
sciences, efforts are assumed to belong to a
single natural kind in that their respective costs
can be compared in the process of decision
making (McFarland & Sibly, 1975; McNamara
& Houston, 1986; Spurrett, 2014). The only
way to assess the sceptical hypothesis that dif-
ferent species of effort have nothing in com-
mon, is to try to find a general definition of
effort. If we fail, this will be a clue that perhaps
there are no essential features common to all
efforts to be found. In the meantime, the default
assumption that all efforts must have something
in common should prevail.
In sum, an explicit definition of effort, one
may hope, would not only allow us to circum-
vent the various paradoxes raised by the idea of
a fully a posteriori account of effort, but would
also foster interdisciplinary collaborations on
the topic and ensure that the term “effort” is
used univocally across sciences. How are we,
from the armchair, to search—and possibly fail
to find—some essential properties of efforts?
The proposal is basically that looking for a
definition of effort consists in trying to make
explicit our pretheoretical understanding of ef-
fort; we make a lot of assumptions about efforts,
both in ordinary life and in sciences. By un-
earthing them, one may hope to arrive at a clear
understanding of the nature of efforts.
Four Main Approaches to Efforts
Efforts as Primitive Feelings
One possible reason why effort is rarely ex-
plicitly defined is that effort is often tacitly
assumed to be an intuitively clear feeling, ac-
cessible through introspection. The view that
effort is a raw feeling or primitive sensation is
explicitly endorsed by Maine de Biran (2002:
115 sqq—although Maine de Biran tends to
waver between this view and a force-based ac-
count of effort; see below) and more recently
favored by Bradford (2014: 39). The view is
also prevalent among most participants in the
peripheralist–centralist debate (see above), as
well as among those who subscribe to the indi-
rect approach, according to which the existence
of an external reality is inferred from a sensa-
tion or feeling of effort (see above).
According to the primitive-feeling approach,
the “of” in “a feeling of effort” is not the rep-
resentational “of” (as in “the seeing of a dog”)
but the specificatory “of” (as in “a piece of
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cake,” “a book of psychology”). Together with
pains, tickles, and nausea, efforts are held to
belong to the category of feelings, where feel-
ings are typically understood as mental episodes
that do not refer to anything beyond themselves
(contrary to, e.g., perceptions or beliefs).
This primitive feeling-view, however,
clashes with at least six well-entrenched intu-
itions about effort, which suggests that efforts
belong to the category of actions, not of feel-
ings:
• First, while feelings are episodes we have
—we have a feeling of pain, or a strong
feeling for some person—efforts are made
by us: We have feelings, but make efforts.
Note that this remains true if we think that
effort-talk is primarily predicative rather
than referential: To feel is something that
happens to us; to strive is something that
we do.
• Second, efforts have a teleological dimen-
sion that feelings lack: Efforts are essen-
tially connected to a goal or end, which the
striving subject aims to attain, while feel-
ings do not display such goal-directedness.
This might be challenged in at least two
ways. First, one may claim that feelings
have adaptive value. Even so, it remains
that, from the point of view of the subject,
feelings do not clearly aim at something.
Second, one may contend that feelings,
such as the feeling of pain, call for some
reaction—for example, pain should be
avoided. This is true, but quite different
from feelings being themselves directed to-
ward an end. Efforts do not in any sense
call for the pursuit of an end: They are
pursuits of ends.
• Third, and relatedly, efforts are productive:
One can lift weights, convince people,
solve equations, or win the tour de France
thanks to efforts. One cannot do these
things thanks to feelings—although feel-
ings certainly do have other sorts of influ-
ences on our behavior.
• Fourth, and relatedly, efforts have success
conditions. When an effort achieves the
goal it aims at, it is successful (and, if it
doesn’t achieve the goal, it is a failure).
Feelings by contrast have no success con-
ditions. However, (some) feelings have ac-
curacy conditions (insofar as they have
contents), which efforts lack: Efforts can-
not be veridical, feelings cannot be suc-
cessful.
• Fifth, efforts typically (perhaps essentially)
are accompanied by some resistance, which
the agent tries to overcome. Things resist
our efforts. But they do not in any sense
resist our feelings.
• Sixth, efforts are, under certain conditions,
grounds for desert or praiseworthiness,
which is not clearly the case of feelings.
When one praises a student or a marathoner
for his efforts, we do not praise him for his
feeling. One might rightly retort that, in
fact, we are sometimes praised or blamed
for our feelings. But first, the praiseworthi-
ness of feelings seems to depend on our
having some indirect voluntary control of
them (e.g., one can educate one’s sensibil-
ity). Insofar as they happen to us, feelings
are not praiseworthy: They are praisewor-
thy only insofar as we can do something
about the feelings we have. Second, the
kinds of feelings that are thought to deserve
praise or blame are typically moral feelings
(compassion, envy . . .). It is very unlikely
that the feeling of effort belongs to this
category of moral feelings; the feeling of
effort is rather on the same level as the
feeling of pain or fatigue. Feelings of this
kind are neither blameworthy nor praise-
worthy (we cannot praise or blame people
for feeling pain, except perhaps insofar as
they can be held responsible for having
these feelings).
If this is true, efforts are not feelings. In all
likelihood, efforts are rather actions. Pace the
primitive-feeling view of effort, the “of” in the
“feeling of effort” must be the representational
“of” after all: Feelings of effort are feeling-acts
directed at efforts as their objects. Efforts are
felt, in the same way that hardness, hotness, or
pains are. Feelings of effort bear on efforts, and
efforts, consequently, should be distinguished
from our feeling them.
There might however be a grain of truth in
the primitive-feeling view of effort. Even if
efforts are not feelings but actions, perhaps one
of their essential components—their difficulty
or unpleasantness—is necessarily felt.
If efforts are not primitive feelings, can they
be analyzed? Combining proposals made in var-
ious areas of this scattered research field, three
broad kinds of definitions of effort emerge:
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comparator-based accounts, resource-based
accounts and force-based accounts.
Comparator-Based Accounts of Efforts
An influential proposal meant to reconcile
peripheralism and centralism about effort (see
above) argues that the feeling of effort con-
sists in, or arises from, a comparison between
the efferent order sent by the will, and the
subsequent afferent signals received from the
muscles. In cases of partial mismatch, some feel-
ing of effort arises. This account, anticipated by
Dilthey (2010), found its first technical formula-
tion in von Holst and Mittelstaedt‘s (1950) de-
scription of the efference-copy mechanism, and
has since been constantly refined (see Frith, 2012
for an overview). Comparator-based models have
been widely used to explain the phenomenology
of agency as well as various related delusions and
pathologies (see, e.g., Bayne, 2011; Bayne &
Pacherie, 2007; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith,
2002; Haggard, 2005; Pacherie, 2008). More to
the point, comparator-based models have been
used to understand the feeling of effort (Jean-
nerod, 1983; Lafargue & Franck, 2009).
However, comparator-based accounts as ap-
plied to efforts raise two problems. First, like
centralism and peripheralism, they seem to be
accounts of the feeling of effort, rather than of
efforts as such. That is, comparators might ex-
plain how we represent or become aware of our
own efforts, but they do not themselves account
for what efforts are.
Second, comparators account well for the
success or failure of efforts, but they fail to
account for the intensity or difficulty of ef-
forts. This is due to the fact that the intensity
of an effort is not a function of its success.
Intense efforts sometimes fail, and slight ef-
forts sometimes succeed. Hence, mismatches
between efference-copies and reafferences
are not correlated with the intensity of efforts.
Thus, comparator mechanisms can explain
neither the intensity of effort nor our aware-
ness thereof.
Summing up, comparator-based accounts are
not so much about effort as about our represen-
tation or awareness of effort; additionally, com-
parator mechanisms can contribute to the rep-
resentation of the success or failure of efforts,
but fail to account for their intensity or diffi-
culty.
Resource-Based Accounts of Efforts
Resource-based accounts define efforts in
terms of the “expenditure,” “investment,” “con-
sumption,” “allocation,” or “depletion” of energy
or resources in order to reach one’s goals: “The
construct of effort can be defined as the mobiliza-
tion of resource to carry out behavior” (Gendolla
& Wright, 2009, p. 134). One common driving
metaphor here is that of economic investment or
consumption (Wright, 2014, 2016): We have at
our disposal a limited—finite, scarce—resource,
such as money, which we can use to reach our
goals; making an effort consists in allocating part
of this resource to the pursuit of one of our goals.
Resource-based accounts of effort avoid the main
defects of primitive-feeling and comparator-based
accounts. Contrary to primitive-feeling accounts,
resource-based accounts do not essentially con-
flate efforts with the feelings thereof, and rightly
equate efforts with purposeful action, namely, the
action of using some limited resource to reach
some goal. Contrary to comparator-based ac-
counts, resource-based accounts do not conflate
the intensity of efforts with their degree of success
or failure: According to resource-based accounts,
the intensity of an effort simply corresponds to the
amount of resource dedicated to a task. For in-
stance, the more energy is consumed, the more
intense the effort. One main rationale in favor of
resource-based accounts consists in the abundant
empirical literature showing that prolonged men-
tal efforts negatively impact performance and ef-
ficiency over time (e.g., Arai, 1912; Lorist, Bok-
sem, & Ridderinkhof, 2005 Scerbo, 2001; Warm,
Matthews, & Finomore, 2008).
The term “resource-based accounts” covers a
large variety of theories. An initial distinction
among them pertains to whether resources are
considered to be consumed or depleted after
their allocation:
1. Some resource-based accounts appeal to
some limited but nondepletable resource,
such as attention (Kahneman, 1973) or some
computational process (Kurzban et al.,
2013); focusing one’s attention on some task
leaves less attention available for other tasks,
but the total amount of attention remains
constant;
2. Other resource-based accounts appeal by
contrast to a limited and depletable resource,
such as energy (Gendolla & Wright, 2009):
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Using energy to perform a task not only
leaves less energy available for other tasks,
but also decreases one’s total amount of
energy.
Another way to distinguish among resource-
based accounts is according to the category of
resource they appeal to: physiological, func-
tional or psychological, or simply conceptual:
1. Physiological approaches appeal to meta-
bolic resources, glucose depletion being one
main candidate (see Gailliot & Baumeister,
2007; Gailliot et al., 2007 for a review).
Holroyd (2016)’s “waste disposal hypothe-
sis” proposes instead that resource depletion
corresponds in fact to the accumulation of a
toxic waste product in neutral tissue (amy-
loid-beta).
2. On a functional level, depletion of a compu-
tational capacity is often appealed to (Kurz-
ban et al., 2013; Westbrook & Braver, 2015).
3. Another influential albeit increasingly con-
troversial proposal appeals to strength of
self-control: Effortful action, in this hypoth-
esis, “consumes one’s self control,” leaving
one in a state of “ego depletion” (see
Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice 2000 for a
defense; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisa-
rantis., 2010 for the state of the art; 125
Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012 for an account
of ego depletion that avoids positing such a
controversial resource as self-control).
4. Finally, some resource-based accounts
have it that the “resource” talk is non-
committal: Although agents engaging in
effortful behavior can fruitfully be de-
scribed as if they were allocating some
limited resource, this does not entail that
there is any finite resource really allo-
cated by the agent.
These different approaches to the resource
depleted in effort are compatible; thus, glucose
is sometimes held to be the realizer or substrate
of self-control.
Yet a third way to distinguish among re-
source-based accounts of effort pertains to the
intensity of efforts. By contrast to comparator-
based accounts of effort, resource-based ac-
counts provide a straightforward account of the
intensity of effort: The intensity of an effort is
just the amount of a resource that is invested in
the pursuit of a goal. But that in itself does not
explain why such-and-such amount of the re-
source is allocated to the pursuit of the goal;
resource-based accounts might also be distin-
guished according to how they conceive of the
chief determinants of effort mobilization. Three
influential (but nonexhaustive) proposals have
been as follows:
1. According to the first proposal, the inten-
sity of an effort—that is, the amount of a
resource invested in the pursuit of the
goal—is a function of the intensity of the
motivation or the desirability of the goal
(J. P. Campbell & Pritchard, 1976). The
more we want something, the more we
invest resources to get it.
2. According to the second proposal, the in-
tensity of an effort depends not so much on
the strength of the motivation as on the
difficulty of the task required to reach
one’s goal (Brehm & Self, 1989; Gendolla
et al., 2012).
3. According to the third proposal, the inten-
sity of an effort depends instead on the
next-best alternative action that one fore-
goes in performing the action in question.
Thus, the cost of solving a mathematical
problem when the next-best alternative is
mind-wandering is relatively low, while
the cost of solving that same mathematical
problem when the next-best alternative is
to have dinner with friends is higher. In
other words, the intensity of an effort cor-
responds to its opportunity cost (Kurzban,
2016; Kurzban et al., 2013).
Although these different accounts are some-
times presented as mutually exclusive, it is
worth noting that, in principle, they could be
combined: The intensity of an effort—the en-
ergy it requires—could be jointly determined
by the intensity of the motivation, the intrinsic
difficulty of the task. and its opportunity cost.
A careful examination of the various versions
of the resource-based theory is beyond the
scope of this article. While primitive feeling
accounts and comparator-based accounts of ef-
forts face some serious objections, I do not
think that the resource-based approach in gen-
eral suffers from such structural defects. I shall
however argue below that force-based accounts
of effort, which I will now introduce, may, on
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balance, be more plausible than resource-based
accounts.
Force-Based Accounts of Efforts
Force-based accounts of efforts explain ef-
forts in terms of forces exerted in order to reach
some goal. Note that force-based accounts of
efforts do not equate efforts with forces. Rather,
force-based accounts equate efforts with inten-
tional exertions of forces, more precisely, with
voluntary actions of exerting some force so as to
produce some desired outcome. Efforts are
therefore not just forces on such accounts.
The reason why this point needs to be
stressed is that at least two different strands of
thought may lead to mistakenly conflating effort
with forces.
• First, the terms “effort” and “force” are
often used equivalently in mechanics’ text-
books (alternatively, “effort” is sometimes
used to refer to a subspecies of forces). The
sense in which we are using “effort” here is
of course different: Physical objects do not
make efforts on each other; effort in our
sense is a partly psychological concept,
essentially connected with the pursuit of a
goal.
• A second reason why effort and forces are
sometimes conflated is that the feeling of
effort has often been advanced as the
source of our epistemological access to
forces. The idea is put forward by Newton
in order to explain the concept of force, and
even Hume, who of course rejects the idea,
recognized that the feeling of effort or
“nisus” is the chief candidate when it
comes to the possibility of experiencing
forces.2 Broad sums up the proposal this
way: “Unquestionably the sensational basis
of the scientific concept of force is the
feelings of strain that we experience when
we drag a heavy body along, or throw a
stone, or bend a bow” (Broad, 1923, p.
162).
Equating the feeling of effort with the feeling
of forces, however, encourages the conflation
between efforts and forces. This is a mistake:
Forces, unlike efforts, are not goal-directed. A
less misleading candidate for the feeling of
forces is the sense of pressure (de Vignemont
and Massin, 2015; Massin, 2010). Unlike the
feeling of effort, which presents us with inten-
tionally exerted forces, pressure perception
presents us with goal-free forces, deprived of
any telos.
Relatedly, as we saw, peripheralists identify
the feeling of effort with the feeling of muscle
contractions. This naturally suggests that mus-
cular efforts are nothing but muscle contrac-
tions. This proposal has, however, rightfully
been criticized: Spontaneous muscle contrac-
tions, such as cramps, or externally generated
muscle contractions, do not count as efforts
(see, e.g., Dilthey, 2010; Garnett, 1965: 78;
Maine de Biran, 2002: 120; McCloskey et al.,
1974; Scheler, 1973a: 120). Muscle contrac-
tions can happen to us, but efforts are things we
do; at best, effort might be equated with volun-
tary muscle contractions.
Hence, effort, unlike force, is partly a teleo-
logical concept. Efforts, on force-based ac-
counts, contain at least two aspects: a force and
a telos, that is, the force exerted by the agent,
and the goal that the agent thereby pursues.
Are there essential ingredients to effort other
than exerted force and goal-directedness?
Force-based accounts of effort have been espe-
cially popular among philosophers and psychol-
ogists interested in the idea that the feeling of
effort presents us with the distinction between
ourselves and the external world (see above).
Key to their view is the idea that through effort
we encounter some resistance from the external
world. Accordingly, exerting a force in order to
reach some goal is not yet sufficient to make an
effort. Consider again Descartes’ world: “If ev-
ery time our hands moved towards any place, all
the bodies in that place receded as quickly as
our hands approached, we should never feel
hardness [!resistance]” (Principles, II, iv). In
such a world, although we might exercise forces
on the objects around us so as to make them
move, we would not be making any efforts, for
these objects (including our own body) would
not resist us.
Consequently, upholders of the force-based
approach typically hold that efforts essentially
2
“It may be pretended, that the resistance which we meet
with in bodies, obliging us frequently to exert our force, and
call up all our power, this gives us the idea of force and
power. It is this nisus, or strong endeavour, of which we are
conscious, that is the original impression from which this
idea is copied” (Hume, 2000; see Fales, 1990; Massin,
2009; Marshall, 2015 for discussion).
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involve at least two forces: the force intention-
ally exerted by the agent, and the resistive force
exerted in return by that on which he acts.
Accounts of efforts along these lines have been
endorsed by, among others, J. Baldwin (1906);
Destutt de Tracy (1801, pp. 113–122, 331–334);
Dilthey (2010); Heymans (1905); Maine de Bi-
ran (2000, 2002; Peirce (1935: 1.24, 1.320,
1.324, 1.332, 2.84, 5.7, 5.45, 5.539, 5.607, 6.19,
7.531, 8.266, 8.330); Scheler (1973b, 1973a:
135–8, 1961, Chaps. II & III); Stout (1931, Bk.
IV, Chap. 1 & 6); and more recently, T. Bald-
win (1995); de Vignemont and Massin (2015);
Garnett (1965); Hampshire (1982); Hamlyn
(1990); Massin (2010); Russell (1995, 1996).
Maine de Biran (2002) introduced one of the
first versions of the force-based account (al-
though he presents it as only an account of the
causes of the primitive feeling of effort, a com-
plication I shall ignore here). According to his
proposal, an effort consists in the exercise of
some “hyperorganic” force, coming from the
will, which encounters an opposite muscular
force (p. 125). Although suggestive, Maine de
Biran’s proposal relies on the assumption that
psychical and physical forces can compose with
each other (an assumption that is particularly
crucial for him because he equates efforts with
the pineal gland linking the mind and the body).
However, even if “hyperorganic” or “mental”
forces are granted (more on this below), it re-
mains doubtful that such forces can compose
with physical forces, such as gravitation, so as
to affect the motion of bodies.
A second version of the force-based account,
which I favor, avoids this problem. For simplic-
ity’s sake, let us first focus on motor efforts.
According to this second account, a motor effort
consists of (i) an agent exercising a mechanical
force (F1) on a body in order to make it move or
stay at rest and (ii) that mechanical force being
at least partly counterbalanced by an opposite
force (F2): the resistive force (see Figure 1).
The two opposing forces here are mechani-
cal. The locus of mental causation is no longer
at the meeting point of the two forces (contrary
to Maine de Biran’s picture), but rather prior to
the meeting point, in between the agent and the
muscular forces she exerts (the dotted arrow in
Figure 1). The proposal therefore avoids the
need for physical and psychical forces to com-
pose (this is at the price of leaving mental
causation unexplained; but addressing this
problem is not the task of a definition of ef-
fort).3
The intensity of an effort, I submit, does not
correspond to the magnitude of the exerted
force, but to that of the resistive force, that is, to
the degree to which the exerted force is coun-
teracted by the resistive force. That is, if the
exerted force is of greater intensity than the
resistive force, the intensity of the effort corre-
sponds only to the part of the exerted force that
is counteracted by the resistive force. The “sur-
plus” of exerted force, the part of it that is not
counteracted by any force, does not add to the
intensity of the effort. The intensity of an effort
can never be greater than the resistance encoun-
tered. This is why there are no efforts in Des-
cartes’ world.
It may be tempting to think that the success of
an effort depends on the exerted force (F1)
having a higher absolute magnitude that the
resistive force (F2), for otherwise the body
would never move in the direction of the ex-
erted force. This view is however mistaken:
When one flies a kite, the goal is typically that
the force we exert on the string exactly com-
pensates for the force exerted by the wind, so as
the maintain the kite in equilibrium. More gen-
erally, we do not only aim at moving things
around (in which case, effort indeed succeeds
only if the magnitude of F1 is superior to the
magnitude of F2); we may also aim at keeping
things in their place (in which case the magni-
tudes of F1 et F2 must be the same), or we may
aim at slowing moving things down (in which
case the magnitude of F1 must be inferior to the
magnitude of F2).
Force-Based Versus
Resource-Based Accounts
Differences Between the Two Accounts
The force-based and energy-based accounts
appear to be the most promising accounts of
effort. Both are structurally similar in that they
equate efforts with purposive actions: the exer-
tion of force in order to reach some goal on the
3 As it stands, the force-based account fails to account for
efforts in which the resistive force is not colinear with the
force exerted but, say, orthogonal to it, as the force exerted
by the tide of a river on the swimmer trying to cross it. See
Massin (2016, §5) for a solution to that worry.
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one hand, and the use of some resource in order
to reach some goal on the other. What, exactly,
is the difference between them? Two key dif-
ferences are these:
1. While resource-based accounts equate ef-
fort with the use of a scalar quantity such
as energy, force-based accounts equate ef-
fort with the employment of some vecto-
rial quantity: force.
2. Relatedly, in resource-based accounts the
difficulty of efforts stems from the fact that
resources are limited in quantity, whereas
in force-based accounts the difficulty of
efforts stems from the fact that voluntarily
exerted forces are counteracted by other
forces. Thus, on resource-based accounts,
the intensity of an effort is a function of the
amount of energy used (given that energy
is available in finite quantity), while in the
force-based account, the intensity of an
effort is a function of the degree to which
the exerted force is counteracted by the
resistive force. According to resource-
based accounts, difficulty stems from scar-
city and thereby cost; according to force-
based accounts, difficulty stems from
resistance.
How are these two accounts related? To
tackle this issue, let us look at an analogous
question that arises within the context of clas-
sical mechanics. As is well-known, there are
two formulations of classical mechanics: One,
Newtonian, starts from the concept of force; the
other, Lagrangian, gives precedence to the con-
cept of energy. Both force and energy can be
defined in terms of each other, via the concept
of mechanical work. As Feynman (1963) urges,
the two formulations, although distinct in their
fundamental concepts, are “exactly equivalent.”
The good news is that one does not have to
choose between force-based and energy-based
mechanics, in the sense that they are not incom-
patible, but, on the contrary, mutually entailing.
The less good news is that one still has to decide
which of the two formulations is the most fun-
damental (if any): Do we consider forces to be
prior to energy? Or do we consider energy to be
more basic than forces?
My suggestion is that the debate between
resource-based and force-based accounts of ef-
fort within the psychology of agency exactly
parallels the debate between energy-based and
force-based mechanics. Correspondingly, one
does not need to choose one or the other con-
ception of effort, if by “choosing” one means
“rejecting the other”—for both accounts are ex-
tensionally equivalent.
This appears to vindicate Kruglanski et al.’s
(2012) approach, which refuses to choose be-
cause force-based and energy-based accounts of
effort. Their “cognitive energetic theory,”
which they also label “force-field analysis,” in-
stead promotes a mixed approach that under-
stands effort in terms both of force exertion and
of resource consumption. Thus, they first char-
acterize cognitive efforts in terms of forces ex-
erted against some resistive force:
Our cognitive energetics theory (CET) assumes that
motivated cognition represents a dynamic process
wherein a driving force matches a restraining force to
effect goal pursuit. (Kruglanski et al., 2012, p. 1)
But, although they initially introduce their
model as a force-based account—by emphasiz-
ing the opposition between an “effective driving
force” and a “restraining force”—they soon de-
fine the driving forces in terms of energy:
Effective driving force [. . .] represents the actual
amount of energy ultimately invested in goal pursuit.
[. . .] For a goal-directed activity to be carried out, the
Figure 1. Force-based account of effort.
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magnitude of the effective driving force needs to match
the magnitude of the restraining force, that is, supply
the energy to do “what it takes” to effect goal pursuit.
(Kruglanski et al., 2012)
I fully agree with them that effort is a goal-
directed activity. I also wholeheartedly agree
with their presentation of the force-based ac-
count, and applaud their emphasis on the need
to appeal to two forces to analyze effort, one
exerted by the agent, the other resistive.
I however, I disagree with them on one im-
portant point: That energy-based and force-
based accounts are equivalent does not mean
that no choice has to be made between the two
in the sense that forces and energy could coexist
in a single mixed approach. Force- and energy-
based mechanics are equivalent but impervious
to each other; no version of classical mechanics
explains motion in terms of both forces and
energy—this would lead, among other things, to
a bad form of causal overdetermination. On the
face of it, the same should hold for theories of
effort. Thus, although we may not have to reject
one of the two accounts, we at least have to
determine which account of effort we take to be
the most fundamental. Kruglanski et al. take
energy or resources to be more fundamental
than driving force. A driving force, they claim,
has two “elements”: resources or energy, on the
one hand, and goal importance on the other. It is
unclear to me in what sense energy and goal
importance can be “elements” of a force; my
suspicion is that this conflates the determinants
or causes of a force with the elements or con-
stituents of that force. Be that as it may, I would
like to finish by addressing the following ques-
tion: Taking for granted that energy- and force-
based accounts of efforts are extensionally
equivalent —that is, that they count as efforts in
exactly the same episodes—which of these two
sorts of accounts is the most fundamental, if
any? After having argued that both resource-
based and force-based accounts face very sim-
ilar challenges when it comes to basic actions,
mental efforts, and difficulty, I shall conclude
by arguing that force-based accounts should be
given priority over energy-based accounts.
Common Challenges: Basic Actions, Mental
Efforts, and Difficulty
Force- and energy-based accounts face three
main similar kinds of challenges.
Basic actions. Force-based accounts pre-
suppose that forces can be exerted intentionally,
so as to bring about motions. The Davidsonian
orthodoxy in philosophy of action has it how-
ever that our most basic physical actions are
bodily movements. Moving one’s body is the
least we can do. Can exercises of forces never-
theless be intentional? Without prejudging this
complex issue (see, e.g., Hornsby, 1980: 20–
32), it might be noted that at least one kind of
fairly basic action seems to consist in inten-
tional exercises of forces, namely pushing and
pulling. Such actions, it appears, can be per-
formed successfully even if neither motion nor
changes in motion occur (“I pushed the door
heavily, but it did not open”).
Resource-based accounts of effort face a very
similar worry, insofar as “using energy” is also
not a basic action according to philosophical
orthodoxy. Analogously, defenders of resource-
based accounts may retort that spending, con-
suming, expending, and investing can be intui-
tively understood as basic actions.
Mental forces, mental energy? How does
the force-based account generalize to nonphys-
ical efforts —mental efforts such as efforts of
will, efforts of attention? One way to generalize
the model is to introduce mental forces, so as to
equate mental efforts with the exercise of men-
tal forces against some other mental resistive-
force. The move is not unprecedented: The idea
that there are mental forces that compose with
each other has been advanced by Deutsch
(1968); Freud (1910/1937, 1915/1959–see
McLaughlin, 1987 for a useful discussion);
Lewin (1938); Sidgwick (1981: 112); and
Wundt (1897: 186). Economists have also pro-
posed understanding the relation between utili-
ties or preferences in terms of composition of
forces (Fisher, 2006: Chap. 3; Jevons, 1967:
133). More generally, force-related expressions
are quite common within both ordinary and
scientific psychology: “mental muscle,”
“strength of will,” “will-power,” “spring of ac-
tion,” “resisting temptations,” “being torn be-
tween desires,” and “attraction and repulsion”
are recurring psychological idioms. This sug-
gests that the idea of overcoming internal resis-
tance is no less intuitive than the idea of over-
coming physical resistance. The key issue,
however, is whether this mechanical idiom, as
applied to the mind, should be taken literally or
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metaphorically, lacking real psychological
counterparts
Here, again, resource-based accounts face a
similar worry: While mechanical energy is a
respectable concept, the appeal to mental en-
ergy or ego depletion may raise the same skep-
tical worries as the appeal to mental forces. An
initial, instrumentalist solution for both ac-
counts, alluded to above, is to use “energy” and
“force” in some ontologically noncommittal
sense. They can be thought of as pure theoret-
ical devices that allow us to make good predic-
tions but lacking real psychological counter-
parts. A more realist solution is to argue that,
like the concepts of parts and space, which have
both a material side (as applied to material
objects or physical space) and a formal side
(parts of a proposition, temporal parts of a pro-
cess; space of colors, space of a function), the
concepts of force and energy also have a formal
or abstract kernel, which allows them to apply
beyond mere physical reality.
Objective intensity versus subjective
difficulty. A third problem encountered by
force-based accounts pertains to the distinction
between two kinds of intensities that can be
ascribed to the same effort —a distinction pe-
culiarly salient in the case of physical efforts.
Lifting a weight at a given speed requires the
exertion of the same force, whoever the agents
are; thus, the objective intensity of their efforts
will be the same according to the force-based
account. But lifting the weight will be more
difficult for small children than for adults (see
Naccache et al., 2005; Noakes, 2012 for empir-
ical confirmations). This difference pertains to
what one may call the subjective intensity of an
effort. While the objective intensity of an effort
measures the objective degree to which one acts
against the resistance encountered, in contrast,
the subjective intensity of an effort measures the
subjective cost or difficulty of the action for the
agent. While the objective intensity of an effort
is only a function of the force actually exerted
and of the physical resistance encountered (a
force measurable by a dynamometer, in the
physical case), the subjective intensity also de-
pends on the abilities of the agent (which in-
clude not only innate abilities, but also long-
term acquired abilities, and short-term
modifications of them, e.g., depending on our
state of fatigue, etc.). The more able the agent,
the easier it is for him to exert a given physical
force (see Wright, 2014 for presentation of this
hypothesis and further references). Thus,
equally objectively intense efforts may be sub-
jectively more or less difficult. While the dis-
tinction between objective and subjective inten-
sity, as well as the determinants of subjective
intensity are reasonably clear, the difficulty is in
understanding what subjective intensity or dif-
ficulty is. Since subjective difficulty is ex hy-
pothesis distinct from the exercise of a physical
force against resistance, the force-based account
of effort seems to say nothing about it.
There seem to be two main options. The first
is to equate difficulty with the unpleasantness of
effort: It is more unpleasant for the child than
for the adult to lift a heavy weight, because the
child has less capacities. This move is however
unlikely to capture the intuitive difference be-
tween the two cases, for we are inclined to say
not just that the child suffers or endures more,
but that he makes more effort. Lifting a weight
takes more effort when one’s physical ability
are low.
The second option is to equate the subjective
difficulty of the physical effort with the objective
intensity of a second-order effort. Lifting the
weight, in this approach, is an effort that re-
quires more or less effort depending on one’s
abilities. The proposal is consequently that,
when lifting a weight, we make not one but two
efforts: the first-order effort to lift the weight
—which consists in exerting a physical force
opposed to gravity; and the second-order effort
to persevere in doing that first-order effort, that
is, the effort required in order to continue to
exert a force opposed to gravity. The reason
why it takes second-order efforts to exert first-
order efforts is that (first-order) efforts are un-
pleasant. This unpleasantness (which depends
on the agent abilities) is not identical to the
difficulty of the first-order effort (contrary to
what the former option claims), but explains it.
It is because first order efforts are unpleasant
that it is difficult to sustain them, through sec-
ond-order efforts. Thus, while first-order efforts
are strivings against physical resistance, sec-
ond-order efforts are strivings against aversion
to (the unpleasantness of) first-order efforts.
While the first-order effort is the exertion of a
physical force against a resistive force (gravity),
the second-order effort is the exertion of a men-
tal force against a psychological one (aversion
to first-order effort). Delboeuf (1881) already
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suggested that such an intermingling of mental
and physical efforts may be the rule rather than
the exception. If true, the objective intensity of
a physical effort is determined by the objective
amount of physical force exerted, while the
subjective difficulty of this first-order effort cor-
responds to the objective intensity of the sec-
ond-order effort required to sustain this first-
order effort. In other words, the subjective
difficulty of the physical effort just is the objec-
tive intensity of the second-order effort required
to overcome one’s aversion to (the unpleasant-
ness of) physical effort.
Here, once again, resource-based accounts
face an analogous problem: The amount of en-
ergy actually expended does not typically cor-
respond to the subjective difficulty of the effort.
Energy-based accounts may retort in a similar
vein that the effort to lift a heavy weight really
involves two efforts/expenses of energy: the
physical energy expended in order to make the
weight move upward and the mental energy
expended in order to expend that physical en-
ergy, which depends on the agent’s abilities.
In Favor of Force-Based Accounts
Can we then find any reason to favor one of
the two accounts over the other? I shall con-
clude this article by advancing three reasons
why force-based accounts of efforts should be
considered as more fundamental than energy-
based accounts: (i) Only force-based accounts
properly capture the idea of a resistance to our
effort, which is fundamentally the idea of a
force. (ii) Resource-based accounts render the
link between making an effort and getting tired
metaphysically necessary, while it is arguably
metaphysically contingent (iii). Force-based ac-
counts neatly explain the apparently paradoxi-
cal facts that we seem to praise and enjoy efforts
partly in virtue of their unpleasantness.
Resistance. The first reason is that force-
based accounts fit better with our ordinary un-
derstanding of effort. It is perhaps no accident
that Kruglanski et al. (2012) start by presenting
their theory by appealing to the concept of
force. From the point of view of commonsense
and ordinary language, it is somewhat unnatural
to describe and think of effort in terms of energy
consumption or of investment of resources. By
contrast, force-based accounts are more in tune
with our ordinary thinking. They are, to begin
with, in accordance with the etymology of the
term “effort,” which comes for the old French
esforz, meaning “exerting strength.” Addition-
ally, the way they capture the intensity or dif-
ficulty of effort corresponds to the way we
describe efforts as attempts to overcome some
resistance, or as striving against opposition. By
contrast, resource-based accounts do not di-
rectly capture this idea of resistance to our
efforts, but replace it with the concept of cost.
Striving and getting tired. The second ar-
gument in favor of force-based accounts is
that such accounts are less likely than re-
source-based accounts to beg the question
about the relation between effort and fatigue.
The worry is that the idea of depletion of
energy seems more tightly connected with the
process of getting tired than with the action of
striving. There is no doubt that there are
strong empirical connections between fatigue
and effort. As mentioned above, one main
argument in favor of resource-based accounts
is based on the empirically established fact
that prolonged mental efforts negatively im-
pact performance and efficiency over time
(e.g., Arai, 1912; Lorist et al., 2005; Scerbo,
2001; Warm et al., 2008). But precisely be-
cause such a connection between effort and
fatigue needs to be established empirically, it
should not be part of our general definition of
effort. If we are to claim that efforts cause
fatigue, or increases thereof, and if increasing
fatigue is understood in term of energy deple-
tion, then effort should not itself be under-
stood in terms of energy depletion. Otherwise
put, the relation between effort and fatigue
should not be prejudged by our very definition
of effort. One may perhaps conceive of a
being with an infinite amount of energy at his
disposal—a being who therefore never gets
tired— despite his making constant and in-
tense efforts. Subjectively, such a being could
find effort hard, unpleasant, and difficult. He
may grimace in pain when lifting heavy
weights. But he never feels tired as a result.
(Or think of a miser who can print money at
will, but who still strives to overcome his
repulsion toward spending it.) Such an inde-
fatigable yet striving being may well be em-
pirically impossible, but he is arguably not
metaphysically impossible; hence, such a pos-
sibility should not be precluded by our very
definition of effort. The trouble is that this is
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precisely what resource-based accounts of ef-
fort tend to do: They render the link between
effort and fatigue analytic and essential.
Force-based accounts, by contrast, stay clear
of any substantive commitment about the re-
lationship between fatigue and effort.
Praiseworthy and enjoyable because
unpleasant. The third and last argument in
favor of the priority of force-based accounts is
that, contrary to resource-based accounts, force-
based accounts provide a straightforward and
plausible way out of two paradoxes concerning
our normative assessment of effort. The two
paradoxes arise from the widely admitted fact
that efforts are unpleasant: “Efforts are from
their very nature more or less disagreeable,”
writes Hearn (1864), Ortega y Gasset (1949:
1170) concurs: “Effort is only effort when it
begins to hurt.” In spite of this, we ascribe,
seemingly paradoxically, two chief kinds of
positive value to effort:
(1) We (sometime) ascribe positive hedonic
value to efforts. In spite of their unpleas-
antness, efforts are sometimes enjoyed.
We speak of having or developing a taste
for effort (Waterman, 2005), we speak of
the satisfaction and gratification of efforts,
and we take pleasure in a large panoply of
effortful activities, such as endurance
sports, difficult games, or scientific re-
search.
(2) We (typically) ascribe positive moral
value to effort. Under some conditions to
be specified,4 efforts are widely held to be
praiseworthy, admirable, and to constitute
one main ground of desert (see above).
These two positive evaluations of effort raise
two parallel axiological paradoxes:
(1) If efforts are unpleasant— hedonically
bad—how can they also be pleasant?
(2) If efforts are unpleasant— hedonically
bad—how is it that they are sometimes
morally good?
The paradoxes are all the more pressing given
that the unpleasantness of effort appears to be
part of the explanation of their pleasantness and
of their moral value: Efforts are pleasant and
praiseworthy, or so it seems, partly because
they are unpleasant. We would neither enjoy
nor praise efforts if they were not somehow
unpleasant. This is very odd. Could it be that
our positive hedonic and moral assessments of
effort rely on some suspiciously flagellant con-
viction? Does enjoying and praising efforts in
virtue of their unpleasantness amount to ascrib-
ing intrinsic value to the self-infliction of pain?
There are, broadly speaking, two ways out of
these paradoxes. The first, which may be
dubbed “ascetic,” has it that efforts accrue
moral value because they manifest one’s self-
control. Thus, efforts may engender some pride
about one’s self-mastery, hence explaining the
pleasantness of effort. For the same reason,
effort might deserve to be praised.
Instead of trying to rebut ascetic proposals of
this kind (see Bradford, 2014:107 for critics), I
would like to explore a somewhat less compla-
cent approach to the hedonic and moral values
of efforts. Pleasures taken in efforts are typi-
cally less reflexive than the pleasure of self-
pride. They typically belong to the category of
pleasures in activity, in which one is absorbed
in the task being performed. Pleasures in activ-
ity are to be contrasted with pleasures of attain-
ment: In pleasures in activities, one takes plea-
sure in pursuing certain ends in contrast to
attaining them (Allen, 1930; Bain, 1875; Bühler
–see Mulligan, 1988; Johannson, 2001; Ryle &
Gallie, 1954; Shand, 1920; Sidgwick, 1981).
Now, if all activities are effortful, and if all
efforts are unpleasant, then every pleasure in
activity involves mixed feelings (Massin, 2011a,
2014a), which raises the paradox we are now
dealing with. But pleasures in activity also sug-
gest a solution. A plausible explanation of the
paradoxical connection between the enjoyment
and the unpleasantness of effort is this: Games
that are too easy are boring; unchallenging ac-
tivities quickly become unpleasant. Up to a cer-
4 I am here ignoring several complications. First, one
common ground for skepticism with respect to the moral
value of effort is that, to the extent that the ability to make
efforts is itself undeserved—for example, because some
people are borne more prone to effort than others—efforts
cannot ground desert (Rawls, 1971, p. 104; see Sher, 1979
for one possible answer). Second, malicious or pointless
efforts do not seem morally valuable. Third, even rational
efforts directed at valuable goals might not be valuable. A
common idea within Aristotelian virtue ethics, but also
within Stoic ethics (K. Campbell, 1985), is that accomplish-
ing deeds effortlessly makes one even more praiseworthy
(see Douglas, 2014; Sorensen, 2010 for discussion).
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tain limit (above which despondency takes
over; see Brandstätter et al. 2013), the more we
encounter resistance or adversity, the more we
enjoy the activity. On this hypothesis, the
ground of the effort’s pleasantness does not so
much lie in self-pride than in the challenge
offered by adversity. While this hypothesis is
hardly expressible in terms of resource deple-
tion—for the reason mentioned above, that the
ideas of adversity, resistance, and opposition do
not figure in such accounts—it is straightfor-
wardly captured by force-based accounts of ef-
fort, which construe effort as exertion of forces
against some resistance.
What about the moral value of efforts under
this approach? Nietzsche paid particular atten-
tion to two aforementioned paradoxes about
effort—that is, that an effort’s pleasantness de-
pends on its difficulty and that the virtue and
freedom of the striving agent depends on his
encountering resistance (Dries, 2015; Nietz-
sche, 1968; Reginster, 2007). On a broadly
Nietzschean account, the moral worth of effort
consists in some agonistic value. The corre-
sponding virtue is not that of self-control, but
rather that of perseverance or tenacity. In the
same way that the pleasures of pursuit are of
higher hedonic value than then pleasures of
attainment, the value that accrues to the striving
against some resistance is held to be morally
superior to the value of the achievement of
overcoming it. Here again, resource-based ac-
counts of effort cannot clearly make sense of
this idea because they fail to clearly connect
effort with resistance.
Wrapping up, defining efforts in terms of
voluntary exertion of forces against some resis-
tive force allows one to explain the hedonic
value of efforts in terms of the pleasure taken in
challenging activity; and it allows one to ex-
plain the moral worth of effort in terms of the
value of tenacious striving against adversity.
Both the hedonic and the moral values of effort,
so understood, are grounded in the opposition
between active and passive forces that lie at the
heart of effort.
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